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Abstract 
We present an agent-based computational model in which bounded rational firms 
and workers trade on fully decentralized markets for final goods and labor by means 
of random matching protocols. The model replicates several macroeconomic 
phenomena regularly observed in the data, with aggregate features emerging from 
the localized interactions of individual entities. The model is then used as a 
computational laboratory to run an experiment on the role of fiscal policy in 
increasing macroeconomic performance.    
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1. Introduction 
Balancing the roles of individual rationality, institutions and evolutionary 
forces in understanding long-run economic performance has long been a central 
concern of the economic profession. While the neoclassical paradigm has 
traditionally emphasized rationality as the key to economic efficiency, scholars 
belonging to schools of thought as diverse as the post-Keynesian and the 
evolutionary ones has popularized the view according to which severe 
cognitive and procedural bounds on individual rationality prevents agents to 
adhere to fully optimizing behavior. Institutions and selection mechanisms then 
naturally enter the scene, the former ones as a means to reduce uncertainty 
providing a stable – albeit not necessarily efficient − structure to social 
interactions, the latter ones as the determinants of industrial demography.  
For macroeconomists, such a contraposition is closely related to another 
heated methodological debate, i.e. the one centered on the program of 
microfoundation of macroeconomics and on the meaning and convenience of 
the representative agent approach. In a series of inspiring contributions, Alan 
Kirman (1992, 1997, 1999) has convincingly dubbed the representative agent as 
unfitted to put individual rationality at the roots of macroeconomics, as well as 
to solve the problem of aggregation. He advocates instead a vision of the 
economy in terms of a complex system, in which it is the interactions of a 
multitude of heterogeneous individuals with limited power of reasoning that 
generates the emergence of a number of macroeconomic phenomena, which 
would be otherwise difficult to explain with standard models.  
A useful research strategy to model the economy as a complex system 
consists in exploiting the potentialities of agent-based computational techniques 
(Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Tesfatsion, 2002)). At the simplest level, agent-based 
models are computer programs that simulate the autonomous behavior of 
individual entities and the relationships between them. Such virtual 
environments are particularly powerful and flexible, as they can be employed 
for advancing theoretical conjectures as well as for testing alternative normative 
prescriptions in a controlled situation. In fact, we claim that the agent-based 
approach represents a fruitful methodology to do realistic macroeconomics, that 
is one based on bounded rational, heterogeneous interacting agents adapting to 
a complex world. 
In this paper we present the results of a computational experiment of 
redistributive policy in an agent-based model in which decentralized 
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transactions occur through bilateral bargains. We model an economy populated 
by a large number of firms and workers/consumers who execute their trades 
on the markets for goods and labor, by means of random matching protocols. 
Individual choices are updated adaptively according to simple routinized 
procedures, which are sometimes conducive to failure. Hence, this study is 
rooted in the Nelson and Winter (1982) methodological perspective, according 
to which substantive and procedural uncertainty force real agents operating in 
complex markets to adopt heuristic procedures or routines, while natural 
economic selection forces the exit of agents whose fitness turns out to be 
insufficient.  
Simulations of a baseline model in which firms invest part of their operating 
profits in R&D exhibit interesting aggregate behaviors emerging from the 
dispersed interactions of individual entities. In particular, the economy 
displays: i) sustained growth characterized by large fluctuations; ii) key stylized 
facts of the labor market, like the Beveridge, the Phillips and the Okun curves; 
iii) fat-tailed distributions for the growth rates of firms’ size, for labor incomes 
and for firms’ equity, as one can typically observe in the data; iv) a non-
monotonic relationship between the amount spent in R&D at an individual 
level and macroeconomic performance measured by the growth rate of 
aggregate output.  
A key point which deserves to be emphasized is that the facts listed above 
are largely dependent from the institutional framework – e.g., trading protocols 
and the information acquisition technology − rather than learning or rationality 
effects, given that agents are endowe  with almost-zero intelligence (Gode and 
Sunder, 1993). In fact, the simple fact of recognizing the importance of the 
institutional framework in shaping aggregate outcomes leads naturally to the 
issue of how to exogenously design institutions aimed at fostering economic 
performance or, in other terms, to economic policy. Since the system 
endogenously generates substantial heterogeneity of firms’ size and personal 
incomes, it seems worthwhile to ask whether one can find some redistributive 
scheme which can generate better macroeconomic performances in terms of e.g. 
the level and growth rate of aggregate output.  
To address this question, we use the baseline model as a computational 
laboratory to investigate the role of alternative fiscal policies in a 
macroeconomy characterized by heterogeneous interacting agents. The model 
economy is thus supplemented with a government who levies taxes on 
corporate profits and redistribute revenues, under the constraint that the public 
budget is always balanced. Alternative treatment designs are compared, where 
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we use as treatment variables the tax rate and transfer payments, which can be 
tailored to benefit unemployed people or firms’ R&D investments.  
To briefly summarize our results, we find that the aggregate output is non-
monotonically related with the level of the flat rate tax on corporate profits – 
i.e., output increases with the level of the tax rate up to a threshold which can 
be dubbed as pseudo-optimal – as soon as revenues are redistributed on a per-
capita basis to subsidize investments in R&D. On the contrary, the net effect in 
terms of aggregate output is negative for any level of the tax rate if transfer 
payments are used to provide unemployment insurance. Furthermore, the level 
of the optimal tax rate in the former case depends critically on the level of 
private efforts in R&D investment: an economy with a low level of private 
investment in R&D benefits from a relatively higher tax rate on corporate 
profits, while the opposite is true if private investments in R&D are sufficiently 
high.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the 
baseline model and its setup for simulations, while Section 3 illustrates its main 
aggregate emerging properties. In Section 4 we describe the experimental 
design aimed at assessing the effectiveness of alternative fiscal policies, and 
discuss our findings. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
We consider a sequential economy populated by a large number of firms i = 1, 
…, I, and a large number of workers/consumers, j = 1, …, J, who undertake 
decisions at discrete times t = 1, …, T on the markets for a homogeneous non-
storable consumption good and labor services. Firms are run by a single 
manager each, who share the following two features. First, they use bounded 
rational decision rules, in that they choose prices and quantities in an adaptive 
way. Second, managers employ a common fraction of net profits to make 
uncertain investments in R&D, with the aim of increasing the productivity of 
their firm. 
Both the goods and the labor markets are characterized by decentralized 
search and matching processes, which imply out-of-equilibrium dynamics. 
Thus, due to the absence of market-clearing mechanisms the economy is 
characterized by the contemporaneous occurrence of persistent involuntary 
unemployment, unsold production and excess individual demand. 
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2.1 Sequence of events 
The sequence of events occurring in each period runs as follows: 
1. At the beginning of the time period t, the generic ith firm checks its financial 
viability, given by the stock of precautionary reserves accumulated from 
past retained earnings (net worth) Ait = Ait-1 + (1 - σ)π it-1, where πit-1 are 
nominal profits in period t−1 and σ the fraction spent for R&D investment. If 
the net worth is positive, the firm starts a new production cycle. If on the 
contrary the net worth is lower or equal to zero, the firm becomes 
technically insolvent and shuts down due to bankruptcy.1 In this case, a new 
firm enters the market. Each entrant is simply a random copy of surviving 
firms.  
2. The productivity of firm i is increased by a random amount whose expected 
value depends on the investment in R&D, which is a fixed fraction of the last 
period profits σπit-1. 
3. Starting from the demand it expects to face, each operating firm determines 
the amount of output to be produced and the amount of labor to be hired. 
Expectations on future demand are updated adaptively. 
4. Workers update the satisficing wage they ask for, taking into account price 
inflation and their occupational status. 
5. A fully decentralized labor market opens. Firms post their vacancies on the 
basis of their labor demand. Each worker, in turn, sends M applications to 
firms: one to the firm in which he worked in the last period (if employed), 
and M–1 at random. Firms sort workers’ applications by wage level (in 
ascending order) and hire workers until they have no open vacancies. At the 
end of the period the matching protocol determines whether unfilled 
vacancies or unemployed workers remain after the labor market has closed.  
6. Production takes the whole period t, regardless of the scale of output. 
7. After production is completed, the market for the consumption good opens. 
Firms post their offer price, while consumers are allowed to muddle 
through searching for a satisfying deal to spend the labor income gained 
during the period t-1. If a firm ends up with excess supply, it gets rid of the 
unsold goods at zero costs.  
8. Firms collect revenues, pay their wage bill, calculate profits, allocate a 
fraction of their profits to R&D, and update their net worth. 
                                                 
1
 A far from trivial consequence of bankruptcy is the impossibility for the firm to pay the whole wage bill 
it owes to the workers employed in that period. Then workers obtain only a fraction of revenues of firm, 
Rit  plus a fraction of cash flow of Ait  available. In other terms, workers bear the risk of firms’ bankruptcy. 
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2.2 Production technology, R&D and productivity evolution 
Production is carried out by means of a constant returns to scale technology, 
which employs labor (Lit) as the only input: 
 
          Yit = αit Lit,        (1) 
 
where αit>0 is the firm’s labor productivity that evolves over time depending on 
firm’s R&D investment in innovative technologies. The search for new 
technological opportunities is assumed to be a risky and un ertain endeavor, 
with the probability of success depending on the amount of money invested. 
Let us define the ith firm R&D investment as RDit = σπit. The law of motion of 
productivity follows a first order autoregressive stochastic process: 
 
           αit+1 = αit + zit     (2) 
 
where the term zit is the outcome of a r ndom variable exponentially 
distributed with mean µit = RDit/(pitYit).2 
  
2.4 The market for the consumption good 
At the beginning of each time period, firms adjust adaptively either their price 
or their output level. For the sake of simplicity, the “choice” between the two 
strategies depends on an exogenous random process: each firm extract a 
number from a uniform distribution with support (0,1); the firm “decides” to 
modify the price, keeping unchanged quantities, if the extracted number is 
smaller or equal to 0.5; the firm changes quantities and leaves the price 
unchanged in the opposite case. Accordingly, in each period each firm has a 
probability equal to ½ to adjust price or output. 
We assume that firms operate in a posted offer market. In spite of the good 
being homogeneous, asymmetric information and search costs imply that 
consumers may end up to buy from a firm regardless of its price not being the 
                                                 
2
 The normalization factor pitYit is aimed at letting the effect of R&D investments on firm’s productivity 
to be independent of the scale of production. In fact, making use of the definition of nominal profits and 
of equation (1) in the main text, it turns out that ( )itit
it
it w−= αα
σµ . 
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lowest. It follows that the law of one price does not necessarily apply (Stiglitz, 
1989). Prices are set considering both the unsold quantities during the last 
period (Sit-1), and the costs incurred in production. More precisely, the ith 
manager sets his satisficing selling price according to the following rule: 
 
   
( )
( )⎩⎨
⎧
>−
=+
=
−−
−−
01
01
11
11
ititit
ititits
it SP
SP
P
   if    
   if    
η
η
      (3) 
 
with ηit being an idiosyncratic random variable uniformly distributed on a 
positive support (0,H). Let us define as litP the lowest price at which firm i is able 
to cover its average costs: 
 
             
it
itl
it Y
W
P = .      (4) 
 
where Wit is the wage bill firm i pays at time t. The price determined according 
to rule (3) is therefore posted on price-tags if and only if lit
s
it PP ≥ . In the 
opposite case, the firm posts the price litP . 
The level of production planned at the beginning of period t ( ditY ) depends 
on expected demand, eit
d
it DY = . Expectations on total orders to be received are 
taken adaptively according to: 
 
                
( )
( )⎩⎨
⎧
>−
=+
=
−−
−−
01
01
11
11
ititit
ititite
it SY
SY
D
   if   
   if   
ρ
ρ
    (5) 
 
where ρit is an idiosyncratic shock uniformly distributed on a positive support 
(0,H), with H ≤ 1. Thus, demand expectations are revised upward if a manager 
observes excess demand for its output, and downward when the opposite 
holds. 
Aggregate demand equals total wages paid by firms to workers employed 
in t-1, as we assume that workers express individual demand functions with a 
unitary marginal propensity to consumption. Given the lack of any market-
clearing mechanism and that bargains on the good market are fully 
decentralized, consumers have to search for satisfying deals. The information 
acquisition technology is defined in terms of the number of firms Z a consumer 
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can visit without incurring any cost. In other words, search costs are null as the 
consumer enters the market, continue to be null if he remained confined into his 
local market of size Z, but they become prohibitively high as soon as a 
consumer tries to search outside. In what follows, the identity of the Z firms 
associated to a generic consumer j are picked randomly at any time period t.    
Consumers enter the market sequentially, the picking order being 
determined randomly at any time period t. Each purchaser j is allowed to visit 
Z firms to detect the price posted by each one of them. Prices (and the 
corresponding firms) are then sorted in ascending order, from the lowest to the 
highest. Consumer j tries to spend all the income gained during the last period 
in goods of the cheapest firm in his local market. If the cheapest firm has not 
enough available output to satisfy j’s needs, the latter tries to spend his 
remaining income buying from the firm with the second lowest price, and so 
on. If j does not succeed in spending his whole income after he visited Z firms, 
he saves what remain for the following period. For the sake of simplicity, the 
interest rate is assumed to be equal to 0. 
After the market for consumption goods has closed, the ith firm has made 
sales for Qit, at the price Pit. Accordingly, i’s revenues are Rit = PitQit. Due to the 
decentralized buying-selling process among firms and consumers it is possible 
that a firm remains with unsold quantities (Sit>0). In the following period, the 
variable S will be considered in adjusting firms’ prices or quantities, as 
explained above. 
 
2.5 The labor market 3 
Firms set their labor demand ditL  on the basis of their desired level of 
production. From equation (1), it follows that the number of job openings set by 
firm i at time t is simply given by: 
 
                
it
d
itd
it
Y
L
α
= .     (6) 
 
We assume that workers supply inelastically one unit of labor per period. 
Each worker sends M applications to as many firms: the first one to the firm in 
which he worked in the previous period (if employed), and M–1 at random (M 
                                                 
3
 For recent examples of agent-based computational macroeconomic models where the labor market is 
analyzed along similar lines, see Fagiolo et al. (2004) and Delli Gatti et al. (2005).  
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if unemployed in t–1). Workers are therefore characterized by a sort of loyalty 
to their last employer, on the one hand, and by a desire to insure themselves 
against the risk of unemployment by diversifying in a portfolio of hiring 
opportunities, on the other one.  
The ith firm organizes all received applications into two blocks. The first one 
is composed by all its previous employees, as employers respond to the loyalty 
of their workforce by assuring them a priority in their hiring policy. The second 
block of the queue, in turn, is filled in by all other applicants. Inside each block, 
workers’ applications are sorted by wage level in ascending order. Firm i may 
face two alternative situations:  
a) 1-it
d
it LL ≤ , that is the desired labor demand at time t is lower than the 
number of people employed during the previous period. In this case, the last 
d
itit LL -1-  workers (i.e., the ones asking for higher wages) queuing in the first 
block are fired, while the remaining are kept. Fired workers have other M-1 
opportunities to find a job elsewhere.  
b) 1-it
d
it LL > , that is firm i wants to increase its workforce. In this case, i keeps 
all its past employees and looks for 1-- it
d
it LL  new workers, who are selected 
from the second block of the queue.  
Decentralized labor markets (i.e., one for each firm) are closed sequentially 
according to an order randomly chosen at each time step. Given that each 
worker is allowed to sign one labor contract per period, serious coordination 
failures could arise as the number of workers actually available does not 
necessarily correspond to the one inscribed in queues, especially for firms 
which are called to hire their workers late in the sequence. 
Workers adjust their satisficing demand wage taking into account the past 
average price inflation ∆Pt-1 and their past employment status, according to the 
rule: 
 
                   
( )( )
( )( )⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−−∆+
−+∆+
=
−−
−−
111
111
11
11
tPw
tPw
w
jtt
a
jt
jtt
a
jta
jt
in  unemployed if  
in  employed if  
ς
ς
  (7) 
 
where ζit is a random term uniformly distributed on the same support of ρit, 
(0,H).  
The contractual wage rate paid by firm i to employee j is defined on the 
basis of a bilateral bargaining scheme: 
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                 ajtjt ww β=       (8) 
 
where the parameter β ∈ (0,1) measures the workers’ power in the wage 
bargaining process. Notice that, according to rules (7) and (8), workers with a 
history of active employment gets, ceteris paribus, a higher wage than workers 
who experienced several unemployment spells in their recent past. Therefore, 
the more workers who recently experienced unemployment is hired by firm i, 
the lower is the per-worker wage firm i has to pay.  
 
3. Properties of the baseline model 
In this Section, the main properties of the baseline model are explored. Our 
main goal consists in addressing a couple of questions which are of capital 
importance whenever one tries to do macroeconomic theory without the 
representative agent: 
a) Is a completely decentralized economy inhabited by far from rational 
agents viable? At odds with macroeconomic equilibrium solutions based 
on fixed-point arguments, by viable macroeconomy we mean a system 
which “[…] has a “corridor” of stability and it is only for displacements that 
take it outside the corridor that it will exhibit serious […] failures” 
(Leijonhufvud, 1993, p.8). The notion of a stability corridor reminds of a 
situation in which microeconomic agents interact along individual 
disequilibrium paths, but the aggregate system displays a stable 
behavior which could be interpreted in terms of a statistical equilibrium, 
that is “[…] a state of macroscopic equilibrium maintained by a large number of 
transitions in opposite directions” (Feller, 1957, p.356). The ability of a 
model to predict such a property is of particular importance in 
frameworks where the Walrasian Auctioneer has been completely 
discarded as an unrealistic assumption. A great advantage of agent-
based techniques is that they provide a computational controlled 
environment for studying when and how a large number of 
heterogeneous interacting agents coordinate themselves in allocating 
resources through dispersed trading activities. For obvious reasons of 
space, in this paper we will deal with normal conditions only, leaving the 
analysis of out of bounds behavior for future research.    
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b) Is the system capable to replicate, at least qualitatively, one or more of 
the macroeconomic stylized facts which have been shown to hold for the 
majority of industrialized countries under normal economic conditions? 
In particular, we are interested in building a virtual environment able  to 
capture the emergence of aggregate regularities as the result of the 
dispersed market interactions of a multitude of heterogeneous agents 
(Lane, 1993).   
In analyzing the properties of our agent-based model, we will first 
concentrate on one single execution of the model, to subsequently present some 
robustness checks aimed at assessing at what extent our results can be regarded 
representative. Simulations of the baseline model have been run for the 
following choice of parameter and initial values for variables: Z=2; M=2; H=0.1; 
β=1; σ=0.05;  I=100; J=500; T=1000. Notice that in what follows we do not 
perform any proper calibration exercise, as we are merely interested in 
assessing the qualitative features of the model.  
The plots in Figure 1 show that the system displays fluctuating growth of 
aggregate activity (GDP), but also that GDP fluctuations are well proxied by a 
Gaussian walk, so that the aggregate output moves in the long-run over a stable 
upward corridor. Fluctuations result from idiosyncratic shocks, which cause 
localized market failures and the exit of bankrupted firms. Stationary 
fluctuations characterize also the time series for the growth rates of prices and 
wages (Fig.2, a-b). Price inflation is slightly anti-cyclical (the correlation 
coefficient with the output growth rate is ω = −0.13), while the wage inflation is 
slightly pro-cyclical (ω = 0.3).  
The evolution of the macroeconomy is matched by the evolution of the 
industrial market structure. The time path of the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) 
index of industrial concentration registers the persistence of a wide and time-
varying (ω = −0.23) heterogeneity of firms’ market shares, while the bankruptcy 
rate oscillates anti-cyclically (ω= −0.17) in a stationary corridor (Fig.2, b-c).   
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(a) Time evolution of aggregate output                       (b) Growth rates of aggregate output 
 
Figure 1. Simulation results: aggregate activity4 
 
 
Figure 2. Simulation results: prices and industrial dynamics 
 
The longitudinal heterogeneity characterizing agents is also reflected in a 
significant skewness of wealth distributions. Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 3 
report the Zipf plots (Stanley et al., 1995) - or (log-log) rank-size plot – for the 
firms’ net worth distribution and for wages, respectively, measured at the final 
                                                 
4 All the graphs in this section report simulated data for t = 501:1000. In other terms, transient dynamics is 
not presented.  
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time period T. Furthermore, in each graph we report simulated data obtained 
from a Gaussian distribution with mean and standard deviation equal to the 
sample mean and standard deviation of the relevant variables. In both case, the 
upper tail of the empirical distribution is to the right of the Gussian right tail, 
signaling that the wealth of richer agents is bigger than would be the case if the 
wealth distributions were normally distributed.5 In other terms, wealth 
distributions for firms and for workers are fat-tailed, as one can normally 
observe in real data. 
 
   (a) Firms’ net worth distribution    (b) Worker’s wealth distribution 
 
Figure 3. The wealth distribution. For workers, total wealth is given by sum of the 
labor income and of involuntary savings from previous periods. 
 
Additional experimental evidence on the viability of our model economy 
comes from an analysis of the variables summarizing how the labor market 
works. The unemployment rate, the ex-ante vacancy rate (i.e., the ratio between 
the number of job openings and the number of unemployed workers), the 
average duration of labor contracts (i.e., the number of consecutive periods 
workers remain employed with the same employee) and the average duration 
of unemployment all exhibit stationary fluctuations (Fig.4). 
 
                                                 
5 Both the Bera-Jarque and the K-S tests for normality refute the null hypothesis for each distribution at the 
1% significance level.  
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Figure 4. Simulation results: the labor market 
 
As regards the second evaluative criterion we pose for assessing the 
suitability of an agent-based model for macroeconomic theorizing, notice that 
our framework displays some interesting aggregate regularities emerging from 
microeconomic dis-equilibrium interactions. Panel (a) of Figure 5 shows that 
average real wage and average labor productivity follow a similar increasing 
path. Marginal costs fluctuates sensibly over higher frequencies, but on the 
average the system succeeds in self-organizing as the technological frontier 
moves up. The functional income distribution shares remain therefore basically 
constant over the whole simulation.  
Panels (b) to (d) of Figure 5, in turn, illustrate how decentralized adaptive 
bargaining in the labor market allows the emergence of a negative relationship 
between the rate of vacancies and the rate of unemployment (the so-called 
Beveridge Curve) (Fig.5, b), a negative relationship between the rate of wage 
inflation and the rate of unemployment (Phillips Curve) (Fig.5, c), and a 
negative relationship between the rate of unemployment and the rate of growth 
of aggregate output (Okun Curve) (Fig.5, d). As discussed at length in Fagiolo et 
al. (2004), standard macroeconomic theories rooted in the representative agent 
approach fail to jointly explain these three aggregate regularities, whose 
existence in real data is confirmed by plenty of empirical evidence.  
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Figure 5. Simulation results: emergent macroeconomic properties 
 
A recent strand of empirical work (see e.g. Amaral et al., 1997; Bottazzi et al., 
2001) has shown that the empirical probability distribution of the (log) growth 
rates of firms is tent-shaped, and it could be well fitted by means of a Laplace 
(symmetric exponential) functional form. Both tails decay much slower that the 
Gaussian case, which in turn would result if the rate of growth of firms were 
time independent. This striking regularity turns out to be particularly robust, as 
it has been largely confirmed for different data sets, different countries, 
different sectors, and different proxies to measure firms’ size. As shown in 
Figure 6, the empirical density for simulated firms growth rates (in terms of 
final sales) has a clear triangular shape, thus adding another item to the list of 
stylized facts our model is able to replicate. A Laplace fit returns estimates for 
the location and the scale parameters equal to µ = 0.0338 and a = 0.194, 
respectively. 
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Figure 6. Simulation results: Laplace distribution of firms’ growth rates. 
 
The robustness of these qualitative results has been checked by recurring to 
Monte Carlo techniques. First, we run 100 independent simulations for  
different values of the initial seed generating the pseudo-random numbers. We 
then study the moments of the distributions of the statistics of interest. Results 
reported in Table 1 confirm that the findings discussed so far are indeed quite 
robust. A second Monte Carlo exercise has been run to analyze the role of the 
R&D in shaping macroeconomic performance. We focus on the relationship 
between the propensity of firms to invest in R&D, the growth of the economic 
system and the average values of major economic variables as the rate of 
unemployment, the rate of vacancies, the price inflation, and the bankruptcy 
rate. To accomplish this task we perform 100 simulations of the model with 
increasing levels of the R&D parameter σ , starting from 0% through 99% with 
1% steps.6  
Simulations show that the relationship between efforts in R&D and the 
growth rate of aggregate activity is monotonically increasing, but also that R&D 
investment display decreasing marginal returns (Fig.7). In our model, a higher 
fraction of profits invested in searching for new technological opportunities 
corresponds to a lower rate of net worth accumulation, which in turn leads to a 
higher financial fragility and a higher probability of bankruptcy (cf. Panel d of 
Fig.8). For sufficiently high level of R&D investments, the two forces tend to 
counteract.  
 
                                                 
6 The setting for all parameters other than the fraction of profits invested in R&D is the same used for the 
simulation of the baseline model. 
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 Mean St. Dev. CV 
Growth rate 0.0013 0.0001 0.0978 
Growth volatility 0.0223 0.0008 0.0372 
Price inflation 0.0365 0.0003 0.0085 
Wage inflation 0.0378 0.0002 0.0065 
Unemployment rate 0.0870 0.0013 0.0149 
Vacancy rate 0.9593 0.0020 0.0021 
Labor contract duration 16.843 0.2000 0.0119 
Unemployment duration 3.1909 0.0487 0.0153 
HH index 135.06 0.8071 0.0060 
Bankruptcy ratio 0.0420 0.0752 0.0177 
Laplace location parameter 0.0352 0.0008 0.0232 
Laplace scale parameter 0.1936 0.0065 0.0334 
 
Table 1. Mean, standard deviation and coefficient of variation 
across 100 independent Monte Carlo simulations of the baseline model 
 
An increase in R&D investment has monotonic but non-linear effects also on 
the unemployment rate, the inflation rate and the rate of vacancies. Recall that 
in this model technological progress is purely labor-saving. It does not come as 
a surprise, therefore, that higher investments in R&D are associated to a higher 
rates of unemployment (Fig.8, a). By the same token, a higher productivity 
forces firms to open less job positions (Fig.8, c), and drives a higher price 
competition which determines a lower rate of inflation (Fig.8, b). The 
emergence of non-linear effects of increases in R&D spending is an interesting 
result by itself. It must be stressed, however, that in our artificial economy the 
aggregate labor-saving effect of R&D is somehow overemphasized, as the 
assumption of a single industry rules out any employment reallocation across 
sectors.  
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Figure 7. Monte Carlo evidence on the relationship between R&D  
and the GDP growth rate 
 
 
Figure 8. Montecarlo evidence on the relationship between R&D  
and other relevant variables.  
 
As an additional robustness check, we explore the parameter space for 
searching costs both in the labor (M) and goods markets (Z). In particular, we 
run 49 simulations for combinations of M and Z evolving in the space (1, 2, 4, 6, 
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8, 10, 20), 7 and we collect the time average of key macroeconomic variables 
across each simulation. Table 2 reports our results. As far as the GDP growth 
rate is concerned, it appears that lower search costs on the labor market have 
limited positive effects, while surprisingly an increase of Z does not seem to 
have any appreciable consequence on aggregate growth performance. In turn, 
different combinations of M and Z determine large shifts of the Phillips Curve: 
as search costs on both markets are lowered, inflation increases and 
unemployment decreases, but the elasticity of unemployment to variations of M 
and Z is much higher than that of inflation. This last result is echoed in the 
sensible increase on the ex-ante vacancy rate as search costs shrink, signalling 
that the labor demand becomes higher than the labor supply as both consumers 
and workers are allowed to search more intensively. Such a soaring efficiency of 
the labor market in allocating idle resources for higher values of M and Z is 
somehow countervailed, however, by simultaneous higher rates of bankruptcy 
due to a stronger competition in the goods market.     
A final interesting result is presented in Figure 9, where we plot the mean of 
labor contracts’ duration for each of the 49 simulations. Data are organized such 
that the first moment of the duration is collected for seven different values of M, 
given Z, and Z increases as we move from the left to the right along the x-axis. 
Two key facts emerge. First, for any given value of Z the average duration of 
labor contracts follows a U-inverted pattern, with peaks invariably given at M = 
1 and troughs at M = 8 or 10. Second, the average length of contracts raise for 
higher values of Z, given M.  
The reason for such a cyclical behaviour along an increasing trend rests on 
the combined effects exerted by intertemporal underbidding and market 
competition as searching costs on both markets decrease. As search costs in the 
labor market increase, the number of applications from outsider workers at 
each firm rises, as well as the probability to hire a new employee (in addition to 
all its old ones) if that firm aims at increasing its labor demand.  Recall that a 
new worker with a recent experience of unemployment, once hired, is likely to 
ask for a wage lower than that requested by insiders. This allows him to jump 
immediately at the top of the queue, while old employees shift downward. As a 
consequence, old insiders will be the first to be fired as the firm will eventually 
cut its labor demand when facing adverse market conditions. Therefore, longer 
                                                 
7 The reason we limit M and Z at 20 is that for very low search costs (i.e., M, Z > 20) our artificial 
economy displays full employment and, as a result, to divergent dynamics between average 
wage and labor productivity.  
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queues due to lower search costs in the labor market entail shorter labor 
contracts, on average. Notice that this effect is reversed for very high M, as the 
economy approaches full employment.  
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M\Z 1 2 4 6 8 10 20 
1 0.0025 0.0026 0.0022 0.0024 0.0023 0.0023 0.0022 
2 0.0024 0.0024 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0024 0.0023 
4 0.0024 0.0024 0.0023 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024 
6 0.0025 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024 0.0026 0.0026 0.0024 
8 0.0026 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0027 0.0027 0.0025 
10 0.0026 0.0026 0.0027 0.0027 0.0026 0.0026 0.0027 
 
 
 
 
GDP growth 
rate 
20 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 0.0029 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 
M\Z 1 2 4 6 8 10 20 
1 0.0239 0.0274 0.0304 0.0309 0.0316 0.0321 0.0327 
2 0.0277 0.0301 0.0320 0.0324 0.0332 0.0334 0.0339 
4 0.0310 0.0326 0.0342 0.0346 0.0349 0.0356 0.0359 
6 0.0328 0.0343 0.0356 0.0364 0.0365 0.0367 0.0375 
8 0.0340 0.0356 0.0368 0.0371 0.0373 0.0376 0.0381 
10 0.0354 0.0362 0.0374 0.0381 0.0379 0.0386 0.0385 
 
 
 
 
Inflation rate 
20 0.0386 0.0395 0.0395 0.0382 0.0393 0.0386 0.0357 
M\Z 1 2 4 6 8 10 20 
1 0.1482 0.1156 0.0896 0.0796 0.0747 0.0720 0.0643 
2 0.1127 0.0866 0.0671 0.0615 0.0565 0.0536 0.0491 
4 0.0769 0.0596 0.0465 0.0407 0.0353 0.0325 0.0281 
6 0.0578 0.0437 0.0318 0.0252 0.0226 0.0192 0.0159 
8 0.0434 0.0322 0.0213 0.0170 0.0132 0.0124 0.0086 
10 0.0330 0.0229 0.0136 0.0104 0.0093 0.0073 0.0049 
 
 
 
Rate of 
unemployment 
20 0.0071 0.0039 0.0017 0.0013 0.0009 0.0005 0.0004 
M\Z 1 2 4 6 8 10 20 
1 0.9007 0.9378 0.9721 0.9902 0.9978 1.0023 1.0214 
2 0.9266 0.9575 0.9896 1.0012 1.0102 1.0202 1.0397 
4 0.9551 0.9778 1.0050 1.0201 1.0353 1.0462 1.0669 
6 0.9716 0.9921 1.0225 1.0390 1.0517 1.0647 1.0881 
8 0.9849 1.0041 1.0356 1.0500 1.0654 1.0717 1.1037 
10 0.9946 1.0150 1.0474 1.0611 1.0713 1.0841 1.1064 
 
 
 
 
Vacancy rate 
20 1.0337 1.0501 1.0803 1.0938 1.1070 1.1174 1.1288 
M\Z 1 2 4 6 8 10 20 
1 0.0419 0.0396 0.0415 0.0456 0.0469 0.0483 0.0582 
2 0.0451 0.0409 0.0463 0.0504 0.0534 0.0599 0.0724 
4 0.0520 0.0490 0.0561 0.0639 0.0713 0.0773 0.0914 
6 0.0594 0.0564 0.0670 0.0752 0.0806 0.0880 0.1039 
8 0.0643 0.0625 0.0754 0.0816 0.0861 0.0907 0.1121 
10 0.0688 0.0677 0.0798 0.0864 0.0922 0.0975 0.1107 
 
 
 
 
Bankrupcty 
rate 
20 0.0776 0.0819 0.0975 0.1038 0.1129 0.1189 0.1253 
 
Table 2. Simulated time average of key variables for different levels of search costs. 
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 Figure 9. Average duration of labor contracts for different levels of the searching costs.  
 
By the same token, more competition on the goods market (i.e., higher Z) 
implies that firms have a lower probability to increase their labor demand on a 
period by period basis, so that the average lengths of contracts is positively 
related to Z, for any given M. 
 
4. A computational experiment of fiscal policy 
The results for the agent-based computational model detailed above seem to 
give some credit to the idea that the complexity approach is a workable way to 
think about macroeconomic issues. The interplay of locally interacting agents 
and of simple institutional mechanisms allows the system to generate regular 
aggregate dynamics and leads to the emergence of several macroeconomic 
stylized facts. Notice that jointly explaining all the facts we showed by means of 
a standard general equilibrium model would imply the introduction of a set of 
highly unrealistic assumptions, first of all that of requiring a supra-natural 
cognitive capacity to the representative agent. On the contrary, the agent-based 
methodology we employ builds precisely on − and exploits the − existence of 
heterogeneity among rule-of-thumb agents. This point leads naturally to a 
closely related issue. As discussed in Kirman (1992), the representative agent 
device is particularly badly equipped for analyzing redistributive policies, 
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while the possibility to keep track of the dynamical path of individual entities is 
one of the major strengths of agent-based techniques.  
Thus, in this Section we present the results of a computational experiment 
aimed at exploring the qualitative consequences of alternative fiscal policies in 
our model economy. The baseline model of Section 2 is augmented with a 
public agency, whose role consists in collecting tax revenues from firms and to 
subsequently redistribute them during the same period. We will consider two 
alternative scenarios. In Treatment 1, the agency applies a flat tax rate (τ) to 
firms’ profits; tax revenues are then redistributed as unemployment benefits. In 
Treatment 2, on the contrary, tax revenues are redistributed to firms on a per-
capita basis as cash incentives for investing in R&D. All the other characteristics 
of the model are unchanged. From a theoretical viewpoint, Treatment 1 is 
aimed at capturing the influence on macroeconomic performance of policies 
aimed at fostering aggregate demand, while Treatment 2 concentrates on the 
effects of supply-side policy interventions. 
Figure 10 clearly shows that in Treatment 1 a redistributive policy is harmful 
for aggregate growth. The average growth rate of aggregate output decreases 
almost monotonically as the profit tax rate is increased from 0% to 99%. For 
sufficiently high tax rates, the GDP growth becomes negative. 
 
 
Figure 10. Treatment 1: relationship between tax rate and GDP growth rate 
 
The reason for the negative performance of redistributive schemes aimed at 
fostering aggregate spending is that the growth-enhancing effect of higher 
demand implied by equation (5) is more than offset by lower investment in new 
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technological opportunities, as the fraction of firms’ after-tax profits destined to 
R&D investments shrinks proportionally to increases in the tax rate.  
A different picture emerges as we move to Treatment 2. The graph in Figure 
11 shows that a redistributive scheme aimed at promoting investment in more 
productive technologies affects positively the growth rate of aggregate output. 
The effect is reversed as the tax rate is raised to more than 60%, however.  
 
 
Figure 11. Treatment 2: relationship between tax rate and GDP growth rate   
 
The turning point in the graph of Figure 11 takes place as the growth-
enhancing effect associated to the redistribution of resources aimed at R&D 
investment is more than counteracted by the increase in systemic financial 
fragility associated to lower individual net worth.  This fact is reflected in a 
boost of bankruptcies as the tax rate rises slightly above 60% (Fig.12, d) on the 
one hand, and in the negative modal firms growth rate (i.e., the location 
parameter of the Laplace firms growth rate distribution) as the tax rate 
approaches that same level (Fig.13), on the other one. Notice that the tax rate is 
almost neutral on the modal firms growth rate as it is increased from 0% to 40%. 
The 60% tax rate threshold causes qualitative changes also in the dynamics 
of the rate of unemployment, whose increase becomes steeper (Fig.12, a). When 
the growth rate of aggregate output declines, the increase in unemployment 
caused by higher investment in labor-saving technological improvements is 
coupled to that caused by a lower labor demand as the growth rate of aggregate 
activity slows down. The same mechanism is at the root of the discontinuity in 
the relations for the rate of vacancies and the rate of inflation (Fig.12, b-c).  
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Figure 12. Treatment 2: relationship between tax rate and other relevant variables 
 
 
Figure 13. Treatment 2: shape of the firms growth rate distribution  
for different level of the tax rate 
 
To fully appreciate how redistributive policies aimed at promoting R&D 
affect macroeconomic performance, the relation between the level of taxation on 
profits and of private effort in R&D is further explored. Recall that all the 
results from the fiscal experiment shown so far have been obtained for σ = 0.05. 
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In additional simulation runs, the same setting as in Treatment 2 is employed to 
perform a comparison between two alternative scenarios. First, we allow firms 
to increase the fraction of profits they allocate to R&D (scenario A). Second, we 
set the parameter σ to zero (no private R&D investment), and merely allow each 
firm to invest in R&D the cash it receives as the fiscal agency redistribute fiscal 
revenues on a per-capita basis. In this way it is possible to appreciate the role of 
heterogeneity in levels of R&D investment on aggregate growth. Figure 14 
shows that a public intervention in terms of horizontal equality redistribution 
yields a lower performance than the private-R&D solution, for any rate of 
private investment and any rate of taxation. After the tax rate exceeds the level  
τ = 64%, the growth gap increases sensibly.  
 
 
 
Figure 14. Treatment 2: relationship between R&D and GDP growth rate in two 
alternative scenarios: (A) Private R&D; (B) Public incentives to R&D 
 
As a final exercise, we investigate interactions between private and public 
contributions to R&D investment. We find that the gain of redistributing tax 
revenues as transfers to firms is a function of the level of private effort in 
searching for more productive technologies. Some results of a simulation 
exercise are reported in Table 3. As the fraction of profits allocated to R&D by 
firms increases, the net benefit of collecting revenues as a proportion of profits 
and to redistribute them on a per-capita basis decreases. The turning point tax 
rate – the is, the threshold tax rate over which macroeconomic performance 
deteriorates – decreases from roughly 60% when private firms invest in R&D a 
Page 26 of 30 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 27 
fraction of their profits comprised between 5% and 15%, to 55% as firms 
increase their R&D investment to 25% of their profits. 
 
 
  Tax rate 
  5% 15% 30% 45% 60% 
Growth rate 0.0027 0.0034 0.0043 0.0045 0.0048 
Inflation rate 0.0292 0.0269 0.0235 0.0199 0.0097 
Unemployment rate 0.0888 0.0981 0.1143 0.1445 0.2421 
Vacancy rate 0.9550 0.9430 0.9267 0.8949 0.8054 
σ = 0.05 
Bankruptcy rate 0.0407 0.0421 0.0477 0.0597 0.19319 
Growth rate 0.0037 0.0040 0.0043 0.0047 0.0044 
Inflation rate 0.0268 0.0254 0.0229 0.0181 -0.004 
Unemployment rate 0.0924 0.1016 0.1212 0.1599 0.4262 
Vacancy rate 0.9511 0.9404 0.9181 0.8778 0.5861 
σ = 0.15 
Bankruptcy rate 0.0419 0.0433 0.0489 0.0640 0.4821 
Growth rate 0.0041 0.0042 0.0045 0.0049 0.0032 
Inflation rate 0.0255 0.0241 0.0220 0.0154 -0.004 
Unemployment rate 0.0961 0.1066 0.1270 0.1823 0.5136 
Vacancy rate 0.9467 0.9344 0.9122 0.853 0.4908 
σ = 0.25 
Bankruptcy rate 0.0423 0.0452 0.0516 0.0789 0.6496 
 
Table 3. Behavior of major economic variables for  
different levels of tax and private R&D rates 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we present an agent-based computational model in which the 
macroeconomy is modeled as a “[…] complex system where aggregate behaviour is 
determined by the complicated interaction among individuals operating in a simple way 
at the micro level” (Kirman, 1999, p.5). A large number of heterogeneous firms 
and workers interact through randomly determined dispersed trades in the 
markets for labor and for the final consumption good. Agents update their 
choice variables by means of routinized strategies, and a selection mechanism is 
at work which forces the exit of unprofitable firms. 
Simulations revealed that a fully decentralized economy can easily display 
regular behavior on a macroeconomic scale, even if the Walrasian Auctioneer 
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does not operate. Our economy replicates some interesting stylized facts both at 
the industrial dynamics level and at a macroeconomic scale. We subsequently 
employ our baseline model as a computational laboratory to perform an 
experiment of fiscal policy. A government agency is allowed to collect resources 
form firms through a flat tax rate, and to redistribute them on a per-capita basis 
to firms or to unemployed workers. In our virtual economy, using tax revenues 
to subsidize aggregate demand returns a bad result in terms of aggregate 
activity’s growth rate. The opposite holds if tax revenues are employed to 
subsidize R&D investment. 
Obviously, our results are merely qualitative and strictly related to the 
assumptions we made at the start regarding the degree of individual 
rationality, institutions and selection mechanisms. Much more important is the 
methodological message implied by our exercise: we claim that agent-based 
techniques represent a practical and feasible approach to do positive 
complexity-inspired macroeconomic research, while normative proposals can 
be tested in a controlled environment by using agent-based virtual economies 
as computational laboratories. From this point of view, future research on the 
framework introduced in this paper will be devoted to exploit several 
alternative assumptions on the tax code (e.g., flat rate vs. proportional taxation; 
labor income taxation) and on the redistributive choices of the government (e.g., 
picking-the-winner industrial policy; selective government expenditure).  
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